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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Surgeon General has described cigarette smoking as the 
"single most important preventable environmental factor contrib-
uting to illness, disability and death in the United States."1 Each 
year, smoking-related diseases claim more than 350,000 lives.2 
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND 
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at vii (1979) [hereinafter 1979 
SURGEON GENERAL REpORT]. Smoking is known to cause lung cancer. See, e.g., 
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBuc 
HEALTH SERVICE 31 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL REpORT]; U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
SMOKING: CANCER, REpORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at v (1982) [hereinafter 
1982 SURGEON GENERAL REpORT]. Smoking has also been linked to cancer of the 
stomach, cervix, pharynx, esophagus, bladder, pancreas, kidney, larynx and oral 
cavity. See 1982 SURGEON GENERAL REpORT, supra at 1-10 to 1-1-17. In addition, 
smoking increases the risk of coronary heart disease, arteriosclerotic peripheral 
vascular disease and aortic atherosclerosis. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION 
AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DIS-
EASE, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at iv-vi (1983) [hereinafter 1983 SURGEON 
GENERAL REpORT]. Smoking is also associated with chronic obstructive lung 
diseases, such as chronic bronchitis and emphysema. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CHRONIC 
OBSTRUCTIVE LUNG DISEASE, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at vii (1984) 
[hereinafter 1984 SURGEON GENERAL REpORT]. The most recent Report of the 
Surgeon General confirmed these findings. See generally U.S. DEp'T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, 
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 37-72 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 SURGEON 
GENERAL REpORT]. The 1989 Surgeon General's Report also concluded that 
smoking by pregnant women was a possible cause of low infant birth weight, 
higher than average fetal and infant mortality, birth defects; and other adverse 
effects on infant health. [d. at 71-76. 
2. See Blasi & Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 
256 J. A.M.A. 502 (1986) (each year approximately 350,000 Americans, and one 
million persons worldwide, die from cigarette related illnesses). 
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Smoking-related illnesses also impose a huge economic burden on 
society. Estimates of health care costs range from $12 billion to 
$22 billion per year, 3 and productivity losses due to illness and 
death are even greater. 4 
Arguably, cigarette companies and their customers ought to 
bear the health costs of smoking. At the present time, however, 
the tobacco industry has largely escaped responsibility for these 
costs.S Instead, smoking-related health costs either fall on the 
individual victims, or are shifted to private health insurance plans6 
and government entitlement programs.7 
In theory, strict liability in tort can provide a mechanism for 
compensating injured parties and ensuring that the social costs of 
smoking are borne by those who benefit from the presence of 
cigarettes in the market.8 This Article evaluates strict liability as a 
mechanism for compensating the victims of smoking-related inju-
ries and also assesses the merits of an administrative compensation 
system. 
Part I of this Article examines the basic principles of products 
liability and discusses the effect of federal preemption on claims 
3. See Comment, Products Liability':"-Can It Kick the Smoking Habit?, 
19 AKRON L. REv. 269, 269 (1985) ($12 billion); Note, The Great American 
Smokeout: Holding Cigarette Manufacturers Liable for Failing to Provide Ade-
quate Warnings of the Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C.L. REv. 1033, 1072 (1986) 
($13 billion); Blasi & Monaghan, supra note 2, at 502. 
4. See Comment, supra note 3, at 269 ($27 billion); Note, supra note 3, 
at 1072 n.319 ($25 billion); Blasi & Monaghan, supra note 2, at 502 ($43 billion). 
A recent study by the Rand Corporation, however, contended that the 
pecuniary costs of smoking (health care, lost productivity, and fIre damage) are 
almost balanced by cigarette taxes and the saving from Social Securlty, pension 
benefIts, and nursing home care that accrue to society because smokers die 
prematurely. See Manning, Keeler, Newhouse, Sloss & Wasserman, The Taxes 
of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way,? 261 J. A.M.A. 1604 (1989). 
5. See Comment, Strict Products Liability on the Move: Cigarette Man-
ufacturers May Soon Feel the Heat, 23 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 1137, 1155 (1986). 
Cigarette companies can be affected by the health costs of smoking. For example, 
they could lose potential sales due to consumers concerns about smoking-related 
health risks. In addition, the cigarette industry has to spend money for legal 
services to defend against lawsuits by ipjured consumers. > 
6. See Gamer, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Pro-
posal, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1423, 1462 (1980). 
7. See Gamer, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 293 
(1977). 
8. See generally Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public 
Policy and Alternative Compensation Systenis, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 940-
48 (1988). 
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against cigarette manufacturers based on the alleged inadequacy 
of health warnings. Part II evaluates the case for tort liability in 
terms of corrective justice, allocative efficiency, risk distribution, 
and cost of administration. I conclude that the imposition of strict 
liability on cigarette manufacturers is consistent with principles of 
corrective justice. However, I am not persuaded that the imposition 
of strict liability on cigarette companies necessarily promotes either 
allocative effiCiency or risk distribution goals. Furthermore, I fmd 
that the high cost of administering a strict liability regime is likely 
to seriously impair its compensatory function. 
In Part III, I propose a social insurance scheme to provide 
compensation for smoking-related injuries. Its primary goal would 
be to process claims for smoking-related injuries quickly and at 
minimal administrative cost. Compensation would be limited to 
economic losses and the program would be financed by an excise 
tax on cigarette manufacturing. I conclude that, for the most part, 
this approach compares favorably to strict liability in terms of 
corrective justice, allocative efficiency, risk distribution, and cost 
of administration. 
II. PREEMPTION OF TORT CLAIMS AOAINST CIOARETTE COMPANIES 
Injured consumers have sought recovery against cigarette com-
panies for more than three decades.9 NegligencelO and breach of 
warrantyll theories were popular in the 1960's. However, tobacco 
companies generally have avoided liability in such cases by claiming 
to have been unaware that smoking was dangerous.12 
Strict liability has now largely replaced negligence and implied 
warranty as the preferred theory of recovery for injuries caused 
9. See Garner, supra note 6, at 1425 . 
10. E.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d 
Cir. 1961), a/I'd on reh'g,. 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 
(1967); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). 
11. E.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), 
question cert. on reh'g, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), rev'd & remanded, 325 F.2d 
673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), rev'd & remanded on 
reh'g, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), a/I'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Ross v. Philip Morris, Inc., 328 F.2d 
3 (8th Cir. 1964). 
12. E.g., Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482 (negligence); Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 40 
(negligence); Ross, 328 F.2d at 12-13 (implied warranty); Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 542 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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by defective products.13 Product defects may arise from flaws in 
the manufacturing process,14 defective design, IS or from an inad-
equate warning.16 Cigarette companies have always been liable for 
manufacturing defects, such as foreign objects in tobacco prod-
uctsY However, defects of this sort are relatively uncommon. 
Some injured parties have also tried to recover by alleging that 
cigarettes were defectively designed because their inherent risks 
outweighed their utility .18 To date, no plaintiff has recovered 
13. The basic principles !)f strict products liability are set forth in the 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does r~ch the user 
or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold. 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although the seller has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
14. A manufacturing defect arises from some mishap in the production 
process; the product is considered defective because it varies from the manufac-
turer's intended design. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: 
From Negligence [to Wa"anty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 V AND. L. 
REv. 593, 599 (1980); Keeton, Product Liability-Design Hazards and the Mean-
ing of Defect, 10 Cmm. L. REv. 293, 297 (1979). 
15. A design defect exists when the entire product line shares a common 
dangerous characteristic. See Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products 
Liability, 61 TEx. L. REv. 777, 782 (1983). A product is considered defective 
when the risks of a particular' design outweigh its utility. See Barker v. Lull 
Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 
236 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979); 
Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect,S ST. MARy's L.J. 30, 
37-38 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Tort Strict Liability for Products, 44 MIss. 
L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). . 
16. Strict liability may also be imposed on a manufacturer who fails to 
provide an adequate warning about a product's inherent dangers, even though 
the product is not otherwise defective. See Wade, On Product «Design Defects" 
and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 551, 551-52 (1980). 
17. E.g., Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. DeLape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 
1940) (explosive material in cigarette); Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 
190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1930) (firecracker in cigar); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918) (human toe in chewing tobacco). 
18. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.N.J. 
1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191-92 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1985); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655,661 (Minn. 
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against a cigarette manufacturer under a theory of defective de-
sign. 19 
Finally, litigants have contended that cigarettes are defective 
because the warnings placed on cigarette packages were not suf-
ficient to inform consumers about the health risks of smoking.20 
At first blush, this appears to be a promising theory. Until 1966,21 
tobacco companies gave no health warnings at all, and even now 
these required warnings provide very little information about many 
of the health risks of smoking.22 Nevertheless, plaintiffs have 
almost never prevailed against cigarette companies when they raised 
a failure to warn claim23 because the courts have found such claims 
to be preempted by federal cigarette labeling legislation.24 
The preemption doctrine, which is based on the supremacy 
clause of the Constitution,25 provides that federal legislation may 
1989); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 354-58, 523 
A.2d 712, 716-18 (1986). For a discussion of the risk-utility analysis as applied 
to tobacco products, see Comment, The Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for 
Lung Cancer: An Analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
and Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76 
Ky. L.J. 569, 584-90 (1987-88). 
19. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (cigarettes not defectively designed under consumer expectation test); 
Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. "1988) (New 
Hampshire would not recognize design defect claim based on risk-utility test); 
Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 427 (5th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff failed 
to prove cigarettes unreasonably dangerous). 
20. E.g., Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); 
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 
S. Ct. 838 (1989); Roysden, 849 F.2d at 234-35; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). 
21. See Levin, The Liability of Tobacco-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked, 
29 AIuz. L. REv. 195, 208-09 (1987). 
22. See Note, supra note 3, at 1064. 
23. See Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses 
to Cigarette Smoking Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 643, 643-44 (1987) 
(the tobacco industry has never lost or settled a product liability case). 
24. E.g., Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626; Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313; Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1043 (1987); Roysden, 623 F. Supp. at 1190-91; Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 437 N.W.2d. 655, 660 (Minn. 1989); Giantsis v. American Brands, Inc., 
685 F. Supp. 853, 859-60; Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 427 (5th 
Cir. 1989); But see Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 
1239, 1251 (1990) ("We hold that the Cigarette Act does not preempt plaintiff's 
claims.") 
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. For a more detailed discussion of the 
preemption doctrine and its effect on cigarette warning cases, see Ausness, supra 
note 8, at 913-24. 
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